Excerpt from Christophe Jaffrelot’s article in The Hindu published on 6th June 2024
[…] How far will the JD(U), the TDP and others try to promote their own agenda and interests?
This is a key variable which may lead to different scenarios. In the weeks and months ahead, the most likely scenario may consist in a modus vivendi based on concessions made by the Modi government for accommodating demands by the TDP, the JD(U) that will be very substantial, but acceptable.
Another scenario would crystallise if the TDP and the JD(U) were to formulate exigencies affecting the BJP in terms of power sharing or the party’s support base (reservations above 49% or in the private sector for instance). These “partners” may also not see eye to eye with friends of the government (and support, for instance, an investigation regarding Gautam Adani’s activities). The bargaining power of the JD(U) and the TDP is immense: by shifting from one side to the other of the political spectrum, they would make the government fall and could allow the INDIA bloc to take over.
These two scenarios are not mutually exclusive. The second one may unfold itself after a few months or even a year or two later, especially if the Modi government is further weakened by electoral setbacks (the State elections in Maharashtra and Haryana will be watched closely in this respect) and if the ruling coalition, including the TDP and the JD(U), are under pressure from other State parties and Congress: the Opposition has tasted blood and realised its strength in such a way that it is bound to mobilise relentlessly in the street and solidify its unity and even recruit more partners. Ms. Mayawati may even become less fearful of antagonising the ruling party in the context of the new dispensation, and revive her party, the Bahujan Samaj Party.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Modi may not be in a position to keep the NDA together, either because its partners would be asking for too much or/and because he has never been a team player, a pragmatic expert in coalition making apt at defusing tensions by making concessions. The Sangh Parivar, then, may replace him by a man such as Nitin Gadkari who has been supported by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on many occasions in the past. Mr. Modi was the candidate of Nagpur by default in 2014 and his relationship with the Sangh’s top leaders has not improved.
But Mr. Modi (and Amit Shah) will not let go of power so easily: there is so much at stake. And, nobody can anticipate the techniques that Mr. Modi may resort to, to save his post. Time matters a lot here: a political crisis would not make the same impact if the institutions of the Indian Republic have had the time to recover from 10 years of erosion.
However, besides the political actors, civil society is also bound to play a key role again in the rejuvenation of India’s democracy. If this election is probably marking a transition towards a new era, eventually, a change of guard at the State level will not be enough for re-democratising India — and, in particular, to counter the dense network of RSS-related vigilantes.